An Acquisition Strategy, Process, and Organization for Innovative Systems

The length of time required to move a weapon system through the full sequence of events in the acquisition cycle has long been a source of concern and frustration to government and industry officials responsible for equipping the U.S. armed forces. The notion of somehow shortening the cycle duration has been a recurring theme in studies of acquisition and Department of Defense management performed by various panels and commissions. The authors argue that force modernization in the future should put considerable emphasis on the introduction of some unconventional, or "novel" system concepts. They also argue that the present acquisition process is poorly adapted to the timely definition and development of such systems and also to implement new operational concepts. The characteristics of novel systems differ from those of the systems for which the present acquisition process was designed.^

They are so different that the authors believe "tinkering" with the present process will be an inadequate solution. To provide guidance in the formulation of new procedures, this study identifies a few major elements of acquisition strategy that would enable the process to deal with the special features of such systems and the expected environment of urgency that might attend their development. The study selected five such strategy elements: (1) Provide an environment that fosters new concepts for systems and new concepts of operations. (2) Conduct accelerated development and demonstration of new concepts at the subsystem and system level, without commitment to full procurement and fielding. (3) Upon successful demonstration of a new system, permit early, provisional fielding and operation before completion of full maturation development and associated testing.^

(4) Encourage timely and visionary decisions on such programs by enabling programs to be approved and guided by a few senior officials, without the demand for extensive staff support and documentation. (5) Provide a new and separate organization to oversee the development and demonstration of novel systems and operational concepts. To be effective, those officials who operate under such a new system must be in an environment that views an occasional unsuccessful project as an acceptable price for building a menu of new projects that can be used as a base for rapidly responding to new technological opportunities and new operational needs.