The posture triangle

U.S. Air Force (USAF) global posture⁰́₄its overseas forces, facilities, and arrangements with partner nations⁰́₄faces a variety of challenges: fiscal and political pressure to close overseas bases, an overseas political climate that is less conducive to permanently hosting large deployments of U.S. forces, and emerging military systems that pose a threat to forward bases. To inform USAF leaders as they adapt global posture to these new conditions, this report seeks to identify why the USAF needs a global posture, where it needs basing and access, the types of security partnerships that minimize peacetime access risk, and the amount of forward presence that the USAF requires. The authors describe a logical framework⁰́₄the posture triangle⁰́₄to link U.S. national security requirements to specific types of posture, and they draw on new and previous research to assess the utility of hundreds of airfields for almost 30 diverse scenarios.

They discuss factors that affect peacetime access risk, and they offer insights on sizing USAF overseas forces. The authors find that a global posture is necessary to maintain three critical U.S. security requirements: ⁰́₋Strategic anchors⁰́₊ are necessary to maintain security ties to close partners and key regions; access to forward operating locations is necessary to create and sustain operational effects; and support links on foreign territory are necessary to sustain global military activities. Regarding where the USAF needs access and basing, the authors identified 13 strategic anchor countries, 11 basing clusters, and 35 en route airfields as particularly valuable.

Regarding what types of security partnerships minimize peacetime access risk, the authors find that regime type and the nature of the access relationship are the two most important considerations: Enduring partnerships with consolidated democracies are the ideal type of relationship, whereas transactional relationships with authoritarian states are least desirable. To address how much forward presence the USAF requires, the authors suggest an alternative approach to sizing forward forces that goes beyond the current theater campaign plan requirements process. The report concludes with five recommendations for future USAF postures, as well as a discussion of some misperceptions in the current debate about U.S. global posture